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ABSTRACT

On April 21, 2001, the United States and China faced their first major incident of
the 21st century when a U.S. spy plane accidentally collided with a Chinese fighter plane.
The dialogue that followed between the two countries, as well as the tenor of the incident
as reported in the international press, provide some interesting and insightful glimpses
into how these major powers handled the incident in the days and weeks that followed.
Although the mainstream media in both China and the United States reported the key
facts and elements of the incident in a similar fashion, the spin that was ultimately placed
on the event by the Chinese press was clearly indicative of the Asian state’s desire to
portray the United States as being at fault; however, because both countries have an
enormous stake in ensuring continued friendly relations for trade purposes, the Chinese
press eventually adopted an official position that would allow the United States to “save
face” while ensuring that the killed Chinese pilot involved was lauded as a fearless hero
of the state and a martyr to its cause. To determine how these events played out in the
respective mainstream media of China and the United States, as well as the international
media, this research provides a review of the relevant literature to identify how the spy
plane collision was portrayed, what elements are regarded as important for analysis. This
study compares the two accounts from China and the U.S., and to a lesser extent, the
international media, by grouping the media accounts into three separate dimensions: 1)
visual framing, 2) contextual framing and 3) operational framing, to determine how these
factors played out in the spy plane incident. The analysis of the media accounts is
followed by a summary of the research in the concluding paragraph.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background and Overview
On April 1, 2001, what began as a minor training exercise turned into a post-Cold
War confrontation between two of the world’s nuclear powers. On this date, a collision
of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet resulted in a tense – but not hostile –
political confrontation between the two nations. The month-long exchange of political
diatribes that followed gradually diminished in tone until the United States agreed to the
concessions demanded by China, but only after China grudgingly acknowledged that the
United States may not have been entirely at fault in the incident. The stand-off was
certainly not without some serious consequences for the United States, but the fact
remained that when all was said and done, these two former Cold Warriors were able to
resolve their differences without coming to blows. Furthermore, it became increasingly
clear as the media accounts proceeded on both sides that the U.S. and China had far too
much at stake to allow such a relatively minor incident to disrupt their carefully designed
trade plans for the future. When the diplomatic dust had settled one month after the
incident, what remained could be viewed as a clear application of the gatekeeping
function that is increasingly defining the media’s role in mainstream society in both the
United States and China; however, because the two countries approach the media from
diametrically opposite poles of reference as to the freedom of journalists to publish what
they want, it is not surprising that what emerged in the press in China was radically
different than what was published in the United States. Despite these stark contrasts in
content, the mainstream media of both countries can be reasonably expected to adopt a
position in support of their respective governments, notwithstanding any actual blame or

1

wrongdoing that may have occurred. In reality, media accounts in the United States and
China are both shaped by the same type of gatekeeping processes that underlie all
editorial decisions concerning what events should be reported to the public and how they
should be presented; however, a fundamental difference exists between the two countries
concerning the relative freedoms of the respective media in covering these events,
particularly for international consumption.

Differences in Media Accounts
Although the actual details of the spy plane collision in April 2001 differed
substantially in their respective accounts in the Chinese and U.S. media, these differences
were not so important to many observers as how important the role they played in
shaping public opinion as the events unfolded. Clearly, the mainstream media in any
country plays a critical role in shaping public opinion, and the ideological manipulation
involved appears to only differ in degrees. A side-by-side comparison of the accounts
from China and the U.S. might seem to be covering two completely separate incidents; in
reality, though, how the event was framed by the media in their respective countries
represented the important story of the day.
Previous research on media framing has focused on the professional techniques that
shape people’s opinions in controversial situations. Controversy seems to be naturally
attracted to major events such as September 11, 2001 and the recent disasters caused by
the Pacific Basin tsunami, where observers criticized the Thai government before the
floodwaters had receded. The spy plane collision of April 2001 may have paled in
comparison to these events, but at the time it represented one of the most controversial
stories of the unfolded 21st century as the two giant trading partners attempted to forge
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valuable new trade agreements and refine existing ones, all the while walking a
diplomatic tightrope on Taiwan.

Categorization of Framing Functions in Media Accounts
In order to facilitate the research on print media (especially newspapers), the
framing functions were categorized into three dimensions: 1) visual framing, 2)
contextual framing and 3) operational framing, which are defined and discussed further
below.
1)

Visual Framing. For the purposes of this analysis, this term will follow

that provided by Todd Gitlin in The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the
Making and Unmaking of the New Left (1980, p. 7). According to Gitlin, frames in
general are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, or selection,
emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse,
whether verbal or visual” (p. 7). Visual framing devices therefore are mechanisms that
serve to condition the target audience’s reactions to particular news events, information,
or entertainment media programming.
2)

Contextual Framing. For the purposes of this study, this term will refer

follow the definition provided by Richard A. Nelson in his work, A Chronology and
Glossary of Propaganda in the United States (1996). According to Nelson, contextual
framing refers to how fully the background of an event is developed and through which
interpretive lens this information is filtered. It also refers to the use of techniques such
as:
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•

Demonizing. The extent of the use of “good versus evil” categorizing language
and images that elevate or deflate particular individuals, organizations,
movements, ideas, or nations);

•

Equalizing. Nelson states this means, “How puffed up or deflated are the sides in
terms of their implicit strength or importance, especially when contrasted with
one another” (p. 170);

•

Excising. What types of information are left in or taken out of news coverage and
why;

•

Ordering. How the narrative is organized in an effort to favor one side or the
other;

•

Personalizing. The extent to which the protagonists in an given event are
developed and portrayed as being “others” or “like us”;

•

Sanitizing. The degree to which the event is censored to avoid reporting negative
information concerning the actual costs in damaged lives and social devastation;

•

Timing. The extent to which attention is given to a particular agenda, issue, or
group compared to other events of the day (Nelson, 1996).
3)

Operational Framing. According to Mark Allen Peterson, the mandate for

journalists today is to "get" the story from sources with diverse, sometime inimical
interests. “Most news stories are negotiated in defined social contexts among many
different actors, including sources, journalists, editors and press agents” (Peterson, 2001,
p. 201). This level of media coverage should be the goal of all responsible journalism;
operational framing would provide a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the event
without resorting to jingoism or appeals to emotion. For the purposes of this study, this
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term will refer to completely objective news reporting that is absent of any discernible
contextual framing efforts as defined above on the part of the reviewer.
Clearly, then, a universal theory by definition must apply to various circumstances,
various cultures and various societies. Framing, as a mass communication paradigm that
was first raised by American scholars and widely examined in American media practices,
has an apparent “made-in-USA” label (Entman, 1991 & 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman,
1974; Rachlin, 1988; Scheufele, 1999 & 2000; Tuchman, 1972). An important question is
whether this theory is applicable to a media system with a different cultural background,
historical heritage and political system? Framing research focuses on the professional
techniques that influence people’s minds in a controversial situation. Nothing is
controversial than a dramatically unfolded and dramatically wrapped-up international
conflict between two politically and ideologically different countries.
The collision in the mid-air between China-US fighter jets eventually made this
collision-in-the-media comparative study possible and timely. In fact, the New York
Times prefaced its series of articles on this event: “Collision with China: …… ”
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Role of the Media in News Presentation
The concept of “agenda setting” assumed its metaphorical name from the notion
that the mass media have the ability to transfer the salience of items on their news
agendas to the public agenda (Bryant & Zillman, 1994). The concept was originally
studied in the traditional context of mass communication and voter behavior, but has now
been applied to other social and political events as well. “Through their routine
structuring of social and political reality, the news media influence the agenda of public
issues around which political campaigns and voter decisions are organized” (Bryant &
Zillman, 1994, p. 4). This influence is manifested every day as journalists around the
world deal with the news in several important ways.
In the first place, journalists (and their superiors) decide which news to cover and
report and which to ignore. Further, all of the available reports must be analyzed for
newsworthiness and public interests. According to Bryant and Zillman, in an average
Western daily newspaper, over 75% of the potential news of the day is rejected
immediately and is never transmitted to the general public in the first place. This is not
so much a matter of censorship as it is of time and space constraints. “There is not
enough space in the newspapers to print everything that is available. Choices must be
made. These are the first steps in the gatekeeping routine. But the items that pass
through the gate do not receive equal treatment when presented to the audience” (Bryant
& Zillman, 1994, p. 4). Some news reports are used at length and are displayed
prominently; by contrast, other reports only receive brief coverage. “Newspapers, for
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example, clearly state the journalistic salience of an item through its page placement,
headline, and length” (Bryant & Zillman, 1994, p. 4).

Gatekeeping and Presentation of News Reports
In the study of mass communication, gatekeeping refers to the inevitable process
of news selection by the media where various news items are either allowed into the gates
(i.e. selected) or rejected out of the gates (i.e. discarded) through this labyrinth of
editorial prerogative (White, 1950). According to Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G.
Weiss (1996), "gatekeeping" (from the scholarly literature in communications theory)
refers to "the process by which a nearly infinite array of possible news items is narrowed
to the relative handful actually transmitted by the media and heard, read, or seen by
audiences” (p. 6). Gatekeeping has also been defined as the selection of media topics that
are to be presented to different audiences through different types of media (White, 1950).
Even though selected, the messages that finally reach the audience through the media are
only the final screened, structured and interpreted products of the media which is merely
a symbolic reality in contrast with social reality (White, 1950).
The gatekeeping function in practice may include reporters, copywriters, subeditors, editors and, to a lesser extent, media owners as well as the government, various
pressure groups, political parties and single-issue groups (Peterson, 2001). While these
gatekeepers may have no direct influence over media content, they are able to exert
considerable pressure as to who has access to what information (White, 1950).
Larger organizations with public relations departments will inevitably be faced
with some bad news that must be covered. For example, projections of earnings might
fall short of expectations, sales goals will be unfulfilled, employees will lose their jobs,
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and so forth; however, it is always important to report such unfavorable news faithfully
and accurately. As a direct result of the gatekeeping function by the respective media,
some messages are prominently displayed, thereby facilitating low-cost public
consumption, while others remain obscure or completely absent. According to Rotberg
and Weiss (1996), as a theoretical construct that is applied to social phenomena,
gatekeeping studies got their start half a century ago with the work of Kurt Lewin (1947).
This general theoretical framework, Lewin maintained, was applicable to a wide
variety of social situations, including news decision-making. "This situation," according
to Lewin, "holds not only for food channels but also for the traveling of a news item
through certain communication channels” (p. 187). Each of the decision points along the
channel represent a “gate”; at each of these gates, some news item will either be excluded
from the channel, initially collected only to be discarded later, or promptly passed
through various gates and into the news. “Progress in the channel is controlled by a
series of gatekeepers -- the journalists, editors, and others who make the key decisions
affecting a story. Gates, then, are decision and action points that interconnect and interact
with other channels and gatekeepers” (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996, p. 69).
During the last decades of the 20th century, a number of researchers began
debating the relative importance of the function of various gatekeepers. For example,
Halbran, Elliott, and Murdock (1970) suggested that the gatekeeping function actually
began further back in the channel, in fact, even well before a news story reached the
editorial office (the news processors), or even the transmission point. The first
gatekeeper in the chain is the reporter on the street (the newsgatherer), who is responsible
for selecting some stories and not others. Much of the raw data that is employed in
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constructing news accounts does not come from direct journalist exposure to an event;
rather, such accounts are derived from other sources, which are usually government
authorities even in the West (Rotberg & Weiss, 1966). Further, the majority of the power
to define reality, in this view of the news process, resides at the point of the reportersource contact. By the time the story makes its way to the editor, the most important
gatekeeping decisions have already been made. The factors that serve to constrain or,
conversely, facilitate reporter interaction with some sources and events and not others are
important for understanding news content (Rotberg & Weiss, 1966). In this environment,
gatekeepers have played an increasingly important role in the West. “Due to widespread
uncertainty over the precise ingredients of a best-seller formula," write Rossman and
Suman, “administrators are forced to trust the professional judgment of their employees.
Close supervision in the production sector is impeded by ignorance of relations between
cause and effect” (2000, p. 72).

Additional Factors Influencing Presentation of News Reports
Finally, there are a variety forces at play in the decision-making process along the
entire channel of the news selection process that would apply to both a state-regulated
media as well as a free Western press. Certainly, monetary considerations are such a
primary consideration, just as time is another. “The cost of obtaining a particular news
item (its remoteness, the danger involved in covering it, and any lack of direct national
involvement) may cause a journalist or an editor to be reluctant to invest in the progress
of the story along the news channel” (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996, p. 70). If the story
progresses beyond these initial gates, though, once it is actually through the gate, "cost"
is then converted to an "investment" that must be recouped by exploiting the original

9

investment. “It may even be given special treatment, such as being the lead story. More
time and space may then also be devoted to it” (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996, p. 70). This
model has served as one of the fundamental research tools used in political
communication research. For the purposes of subjective research, this approach provides
a relatively straightforward and useful tool for the basis for how news is developed and
understanding the news selection process itself (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996).
Research on the gatekeeping function in the mainstream media, including The
New York Times, was extended by Charles Whitney and Lee Becker's study of 52 Ohio
newspaper and television journalists whose responsibilities regularly included selecting
wire service stories (McCombs & Protess, 1991). This experimental study was based on
two versions of an average day's file of stories that were available on the wire, and
provided strong evidence for agenda-setting through the gatekeeping function. These
newer studies significantly shifted the focus in further research on the gatekeeping
function. According to Maxwell McCombs and David L. Protess (1991), previous
research examined characteristics of wire editors, such as attitudes and opinions, that
influenced their decisions on which stories to select. “The agenda-setting paradigm shifts
attention to environmental influences that affect the selection of stories from the wire”
(McCombs & Protess, 1991, p. 208). These authors add that other major news
organizations, such as The New York Times and Washington Post, also tend to influence
the selection of topics on the national news agenda. According to Gabriel Rossman and
Michael Suman (2000), access to the mainstream media has historically been one of the
key concerns of advocacy groups in the United States. “Consequently, many advocates
and others have perceived network gatekeepers as playing especially powerful roles
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because they ultimately determine what is produced and broadcast nationwide” (Rossman
& Suman, 2000, p. 65). Similarly, Mccombs and Protess cite research by Stephen Reese
and Lucig Danielian that examined the leadership role of five major newspapers, the
three main television networks, as well as Time and Newsweek in the 1986 news coverage
of the cocaine crisis, a topic that also occupied a prominent position on the public agenda
and the Congressional agenda that year. Assuming the leadership role in placing the
cocaine story on the press agenda was The New York Times. Although the frequent
agenda-setting role of the Times is part of contemporary journalism mythology (as
discussed further below), Reese and Danielian were among the first researchers to
actually document this role with precise, quantitative evidence. According to Mccombs
and Protess, “In preparing the daily agenda, editors do considerably more than make
decisions about what topics will be covered and presented. They also make critical
decisions about how these topics will be presented. In other words, editors determine the
frame of reference for a story” (1991, p. 208). Likewise, Wenmouth Williams Mitchell
Shapiro, and Craig Cutbirth point out that how a story is framed has a profound influence
on the story’s agenda-setting impact. For instance, when mainstream network news
stories about major public issues are explicitly framed as presidential campaign issues,
there is significant agenda-setting taking place. Mccombs and Protess add that, “In the
absence of an explicit campaign frame, there is no evidence of agenda-setting. Merely
reporting an issue is not enough. It must be explicitly identified as relevant to the public
agenda of campaign issues” (1991, p. 208). All of these forces come together to
influence how, when and why one version of an event is presented over another, and
sorting out the facts from the chaff becomes increasingly difficult, but not impossible, as
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a result. To this end, the respective positions of the United States and China concerning
the spy plane collision are analyzed further below, followed by an assessment of what the
more disinterested international press had to say about the event.

The American Position as Reflected in The New York Times
While the Chinese press may be regarded as “toeing the company line” when it
comes to reporting the international news, its American counterpart is not entirely
without fault either. According to Bryant and Zillman (1996), “In another facet of
gatekeeping, the substantial agenda-setting role of The New York Times is also well
known” (p. 13). Going beyond the usual anecdotal evidence of this such, Reese and
Danielian (1989) examined the agenda-setting role of The New York Times for the drug
issue during 1986. On one occasion, The Times had assigned a reporter full time to drugs
and led off with a front page story on crack, other major media quickly followed suit.
Extensive coverage of the drug issue began to appear in the Washington Post and Los
Angeles Times. In a Sunday issue in May of 1986, all three New York City newspapers
contained extensive coverage on the drug problem. Further, it also is particularly evident,
according to Reese and Danielian, that The New York Times established the agenda on
this issue for the television networks in 1986.
However, the initial news coverage of the spy plane collision was straightforward
and clearly reported the Chinese reaction along with the factual information about the
collision. According to Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. Sanger article in the New York
Times (April 2, 1001), “U.S. Plane in China after it Collides with Chinese Jet”:
United States Navy spy plane on a routine surveillance
mission near the Chinese coast collided on Sunday with a
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Chinese fighter jet that was closely tailing it. The
American plane made an emergency landing in China, and
the United States said it was seeking the immediate return
of the 24 crew members, all said to be in good condition,
and of the sophisticated aircraft and all its intelligence
equipment (p. A3).
The article also reported a sufficient amount of details to provide its readers with
the facts about the incident, as well as a quote from a Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman who reported a search was underway for the missing Chinese pilot, as well as
an “angry statement on Sunday night saying that ‘the U.S. side has total responsibility for
this event’” (Rosenthal & Sanger, 2001, p. A3). According to the editors of International
Journal on World Peace (2001), the initial American position on the spy plane collision
incident was succinct and remained that way throughout the negotiations: “The United
States had every right under international law to be in the air space it was occupying and
the fact that it was engaged in intelligence-gathering activities was sanctioned by
international law” (p. 99). Furthermore, the Americans maintained that the highly
maneuverable Chinese fighter had most likely ventured too close to the slowermaneuvering American plane, thereby causing the collision and the crash and emergency
landing that resulted.
The United States also insisted that the American plane retained the privileges of
American sovereignty, that it was not to be entered by a foreign power, and that it and its
crew should be immediately returned. The Chinese government declined this
interpretation and consistently demanded and insisted that neither the plane nor the crew
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would be released until an appropriate investigation was concluded. The detention of the
crew lasted for a period of 11 days and concluded with the American’s offering a
statement of regret (“we are very sorry”) for its unauthorized intrusion into Chinese air
space without verbal clearance (China-Us Relations, 2001).
Although the collision was considered to be important in its own right, the incident
was made much more so because it provided the opportunity for a clarification or
redefinition of Sino-American relations. The editors of International Journal on World
Peace emphasize that, “There is little doubt that the Chinese government perceives
American surveillance of its shores and radar installations as a provocative act and that it
seized upon the opportunity this incident provided to express its displeasure” (China-US
Relations, 2001, p. 100). Despite the need for such assertions, though, there is much at
stake for both countries that transcend the collision of two military aircraft,
notwithstanding the associated loss of life in this case. According to Timothy L. Fort and
Cindy A. Schipani (2002), “The downing of the U.S. spy-plane in China may well have
had a different outcome if the economic exchanges between the two countries were not
already so great and the potential for increase so large” (p. 389). Therefore, the accession
of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its increasingly important trade
relations with the United States make any such incident seem to pale in comparison, but
the fact remains that China felt compelled to do something in response, but things have
changed in fundamental ways since the days of the Cold War when the Communists were
clear in their objectives and unambiguous in their military threats.
There were also other factors involved in the Chinese decision on how it should
frame its response. Both the U.S. and China, are of course, nuclear powers, and any
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response from the Chinese would have to take this fact into consideration; furthermore,
relations between China and the U.S. have been troubled by the “renegade” Taiwan, and
there was also the pending issue of its efforts to secure the next Olympic Games, which
was still up in the air at this point in time. “Further complicating the issue was the fact
that China faced a new, untested American administration that had publicly declared a
shift in Sino-American relations from the Clinton policy of treating China as a "strategic
partner" to the Bush policy of "strategic competitor” (China-Us Relations, 2001, p. 100).
Therefore, the spy plane incident served as a “testing ground” for both the American and
Chinese policymakers.
The Long March veterans have largely died off, and as of 1997 or so, the Chinese
leadership has been replaced by a younger cadre of Communists who have increasingly
embraced certain free-market reforms in an effort to bring China into the international
community and reap the benefits of increased trade with the U.S. and others. However,
the Old Guard is not completely gone and much criticism against Western influence on
China continues to be published. For instance, an article written by the Theoretical
Department of People's Daily cautioned, "Bourgeois liberalization causes (youfa)
corruption (fubai) and the corrupt elements then become the social base for bourgeois
liberalization. Many of them are resolute supporters of bourgeois liberalization and ...
their `anti-corruption' is completely false. Their goal is to negate the leadership of the
party and the socialist system" (Chan, 2000, p. 507).
This "bourgeois liberalization" phenomenon refers to a social and ideological trend
among the bourgeoisie that resulted from China's opening to the West. According to
Chen Yun, a senior leader among the moderate reformers, "in the process of the opening
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up to the outside world, it is inevitable that decadent capitalist ideas and corrupt life style
will enter China. They directly endanger our socialist cause” (Chan, 2000, p. 508).
However, the events of the 20th century have shown time and again that politicians in the
United States simply do not understand their Chinese counterparts, while the Chinese
themselves are faced with the need to balance increasing demands for human rights
against the dangers these may represent for their own positions in the Communist
bureaucracy. “To the United States it soon became clear that within the Chinese
government there existed a hard line faction (the military) that the government could ill
afford to ignore, thus making resolution of the crisis that much more difficult” (China-Us
Relations, 2001, p. 101).
The Long March veterans also had their counterparts in the United States: “The
government of the United States was similarly afflicted; the Pentagon and hard line
elements within the Republican party were clearly at odds with the more conciliatory
State Department, notwithstanding the fact that the latter was headed by a decorated army
general” (China-US Relations, 2001, p. 101). Further complicating things for the
American policymakers was the existence of business groups that were of a generally
conservative persuasion but had a major interest in improving and expanding trade
relations with China. “This bewildering array of variables eventually played a role in
developing the American response to the Chinese demands and the Chinese decision to
accept it” (China-US Relations, 2001, p. 101). All of these tended to influence the
manner in which the U.S. responded to the Chinese rhetoric about the spy plane incident.
Furthermore, the American media has good reason to avoid intentionally publishing
anything too provocative since the vast majority of them have a vested interest in
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maintaining good relations with the Chinese powers-that-be. According to Elliot Abrams
(2001), the primary role of the media should be as a source of information. As Professor
Stanley Cohen of the Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem has
indicated, "By far the most important source of information about human rights violations
is the mass media” (Abrams, 2001, p. 290). For both the Chinese people and their
American counterparts, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the media in this
regard. “For most people, television, radio, and newspapers are the only sources of
information. They are the primary definers of this type of social reality” (Abrams, 2001,
p. 290). The American media’s role, at least, is performed in two ways.
1)

First, they serve as generators and sources of information;

2)

Second, the mainstream media communicates the information generated

by government agencies.
In this capacity, there is a negative side to the media’s role because they can on
occasion actually facilitate human rights violations. “They can spur such violations and
even be used to do evil. To take one example, the UN special reporter on the media in
Yugoslavia said, ‘The media in Serbia and Montenegro fostered hostility among the
population against other nationalities residing in the former Yugoslavia’” (Abrams, 2001,
p. 291). Similarly, the submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission by the African National Congress said, "The South African Broadcasting
Corporation was the most important weapon in the apartheid state's battle for the hearts
and minds of the people. [It was] a virulent opponent of liberation movements" (Abrams,
2001, p. 291). The corporation's efforts resulted in an increase in the demonization of the
liberation movements, polarization, and hatred for people from other racial groups.
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Clearly, then, “the power of the media can be used for good or evil” (Abrams, 2001, p.
292). Another fundamental constraint involved in communicating absolutely factual
information in the mainstream American press is that of corporate ownership.
“Newspapers and TV stations are sometimes owned by media conglomerates, and they
have financial interests that can make reporting on human rights abuses dangerous. One
thinks of Time Warner and Viacom, Bertelsmann and the News Corporation, which have
good reason to avoid provoking Chinese officials” (Abrams, 2001, p. 292).

The Chinese Position as Reflected in The People’s Daily
From the outset, the Chinese adopted a unilateral view of the events that caused
the spy plane collision and where it occurred; The People’s Daily stood by this account of
the events throughout the discourse that followed. The Chinese position was just as
succinct as the American’s in this regard, and maintained that the American plane was
responsible for the collision, and that its subsequent emergency landing on Chinese soil
without permission represented a violation of international law (China-US Relations,
2001).
On April 2, 2001, the People’s Daily reported, “It was normal and in accordance
with international practice for Chinese military jets to track the U.S. surveillance plane
over China's water areas. The direct cause of the damage and crash of the Chinese jet
was that the U.S. plane suddenly veered into the Chinese jet, which was against flight
rule. Therefore, the U.S. side should bear all the responsibility arising therefrom”
(Chinese Fighter Bumped by US Military Surveillance Plane, p. 1). Although the
rhetoric intensified as the days passed, there was never any real indication in the People’s

18

Daily that this relatively minor event would jeopardize the carefully orchestrated foreign
relations that have been forged between China and the U.S. over the last 30 years.
In fact, most of the saber-rattling assumed the form of just how large of an
apology the United States should offer, and which words would properly and adequately
communicate these views to the Chinese leadership. According to Giandomenico Picco
(2003), “One year after the April 2001 spy plane incident, relations between Beijing and
Washington were so improved that any reference to that incident was downplayed” (p.
15). Picco points out that this is not a new alliance, but the Sino-American relations
certainly represent a new and significant alignment in the post-September 11, 2001 world
today.
The Chinese position did not vary from its original stance at all throughout the
media coverage presented in the People’s Daily, but the level of hostility seemed to taper
off following the intensive media blitz on the pilot’s birthday on April 8, 2001. There
was also a distinct change in the tone of the news coverage after Washington made the
all-important concession of agreeing to add “very” to its previously offered “sorry” in
framing its apology for the incident.
In fact, on April 11, 2001, the People’s Daily reported that Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Yuxi Sun “said out of humanitarian considerations, the Chinese
Government has decided to allow the U.S. crew members to leave China after completing
the necessary procedures” (p. 3). The article, “FM Spokesman on Letter From U.S.
Saying ‘Very Sorry,’” was quick to point out that this humanitarian gesture, though, was
not the conclusion to the incident and that both sides would continue their negotiations on
this incident and other related issues. Sun added that according to international law and
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the provisions of the relevant laws of China, the Chinese side had “every right to conduct
a comprehensive investigation of this incident. The Chinese side will reserve the right to
make further representations with the U.S. side and handle the incident on the basis of
results of the investigation” (p. 4).
These points, together with the Chinese requirement that the U.S. cease such spy
plane reconnaissance flights in the future, were consistently and unwavering reiterated
throughout the Chinese media coverage of the event, usually word-for-word.
Nevertheless, it quickly became clear that, “In the spy-plane incident, the government
tried to use public opinion for its own purposes but soon found it could not control what
it had created” (Worf, 2002, p. 7). Since it was apparently obvious to the Chinese
leadership that there was too much at stake to risk an escalation of the rhetoric with
Washington in view of everything that was on the political table at that point in time,
something else had to be done. The Chinese political leadership and press decided to
“ride the horse that got them there” and resorted to making a hero out of the Chinese pilot
who was killed in the incident.
A consistent theme that ran throughout the Chinese media coverage was the
elevation of the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, to the stature of a national hero. According to
Eckholm (April 2, 2001), “After he plunged to oblivion on April 1, his jet fighter
splintered in a collision with an American spy plane, Wang Wei was quickly declared a
‘martyr of the revolution’ and praised as a heroic defender of the motherland” (p. A2).
The Chinese government, and the press coverage, did not leave it at that, though.
As the month of April 2001 progressed, there were reports of how the search was
progressing and the ceaseless efforts of the heroic search parties who refused to accept
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defeat. It became clear, though, that these efforts were futile and mid-month, the Chinese
press finally admitted that all chances of Wei surviving had been lost, and even published
an “aeronautical expert’s” opinion to that effect. Interviews with the dead pilot’s wife,
mother and those who knew him peppered the People’s Daily as well, and characterized
him not only as a good husband and provider, but as a ''brave serviceman, a versatile
talent,” a “man of fantastic health,” even a ''meticulous housekeeper” (Eckholm, p. A2).
According to this author, the spy plane incident was just what the doctor ordered for the
Chinese leadership who desperately needed a national hero to help bolster their
increasingly shaky political positions: “Some Chinese even joked privately that the
military had probably located Mr. Wang soon after the collision over the South China Sea
and spirited him away for a change of identity, to permit the creation of a badly needed
national hero” (p. A2). To Western observers, the elevation in stature may smack off
how the North Korean press treats its “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il, for example, but
Eckholm points out that this is a traditional approach for the Chinese: “The deification of
Mr. Wang might appear overdone, even silly, to some urban professionals . . . But
depicting heroes in unshaded white -- and villains in stark black -- is a Chinese tradition
and the party leaders may still find it useful to build up a hero like Mr. Wang” (p. A2).

The International Community’s Position
The type and tenor of response from the members of the international community
largely depended on their respective relationships with the U.S. and China, but with most
countries adopting a call for moderation and calm in the wake of the collision (Sakai,
2003). In their essay, “Two Planes Down: The Chinese Embassy in Washington Goes
On Line” (2001), Chen and Culbertson report that the U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft
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collision with a Chinese F-8 fighter plane off the coast of China's Hainan Island simply
represented a continuation of the political and military initiatives that have historically
characterized the Sino-American relationship in the post-Cold War environment. In New
Zealander Bruce Harland’s view, the collision on April 1, 2001 of an American
reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter was not so one-sided as either the United
States or China would have the world believe.
According to this author’s view, the collision initially seemed to jeopardize the
improved atmosphere that emerged following the visit to Washington of China's top
foreign policy man, Qian QiChen. “The eventual release of the American plane's crew
reduced the tension, but it rose again with the opening of the negotiations for the return of
the aircraft itself” (p. 27). As a objective reflection of how the world views such events,
Harland makes the point that these types of events are routinely used by the powerbrokers in the U.S. as well as China to help raise the level of unease among the respective
publics, and to ensure their continued positions in places of high power. By placing the
appropriate “spin” on such international events, then, gatekeepers in China and the U.S.
managed to squeeze out a bit of publicity for their own political agendas, while
simultaneously painting the best possible picture of their respective positions concerning
the event in the process. Harland writes, “As usual, the hawks on either side seized the
opportunity to speak out publicly and demand stronger action by their respective
governments” (p. 27).
The Chinese reportedly demanded the cessation of reconnaissance flights close to
Chinese territory. The Americans insisted on their fight to fly anywhere in international
air space. From the outside, it looked as if they were groping their way toward some

22

understanding on the procedures to be followed to prevent a recurrence of the incident.
Such an understanding evidently did exist between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the later stages of the Cold War, though it was probably implicit rather than
explicit. If both governments want to improve their relations, as they say they do, such
an understanding may be reached (Harland, 2001).
Reconnaissance flights were a feature of the Cold War, when each side
considered the other as an enemy; however, the Cold War is supposed to have ended ten
years ago. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has clearly stated that China is not an
enemy. Nevertheless, the fact remains that both sides have nuclear weapons makes it
inevitable that they will watch each other closely -- and both seem to accept that. The
best that can be expected at this stage is some degree of understanding and restrain on
both sides. “Time magazine pointed out in its 16 April issue that on each side there are
people who see the two countries as enemies, and are constantly urging tougher action by
their governments” (Harland, 2001, p. 27). The Hainan incident provided the Chinese
and American leadership with an opportunity to promote their respective agendas, and
they did not fail to seize the moment. Harland reports that, “The voices of moderation
are not as loud, but they are powerful, and so far they seem to have carried the day
(Harland, 2001, p. 28). However, it quickly became apparent there was much at stake
between the Chinese leadership and their American counterparts that transcended this
event, or others like it. “With luck,” Harland says, “the Hainan incident will pass, and
the slow improvement in relations will resume. On both sides, there are strong economic
reasons for getting back to business as usual” (2001, p. 27).
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China has dedicated itself to maintaining fast economic growth; however, this
growth requires the American market. “In the United States, Big Business evidently sees
great opportunities in China which it has no intention of leaving to its competitors, in
Asia and in Europe, to exploit. President Bush needs the continuing support of Big
Business and is unlikely to flout its wishes. Presumably, much the same is true of Taiwan
and of China itself. Economic considerations should act as a constraint on the political
pressures for confrontation (Harland, 2001, p. 28). Indeed, China remains the largest
recipient of foreign direct investment from the West and from the United States. The
consolidation of the economic relations between Beijing and Washington has therefore
continued along its predestinated course without regard to “downed spy planes, the
bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, and the Kosovo air campaign approved outside the
Security Council” (Picco, 2003, p. 15). From a subjective perspective, one can almost
envision the Chinese leadership hunkered down in the Forbidden City formulating a
cogent but forceful response to the spy plane incident that would show the world that
they still meant business militarily, but one which would not go so far as to jeopardize
what was really important: the American markets. However, from an international
perspective, the evolution of the Sino-American trade bloc may be thwarted by future
recurrences of this level of hostility, and in the post-Cold War globe, former allies may
become potential enemies. “Many people now think that China and the United States are
drifting slowly but surely towards war. I still do not think it is inevitable, and I certainly
hope it can be avoided. But the build-up of mutual hostility does worry me, and make me
less sure that conflict can be avoided” (Harland, 2001, p. 27). Nevertheless, because
there is so much at stake for the Chinese as well as the American leadership today and in
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the future, it just makes good sense to seek timely and effective diplomatic solutions to
such events, but as the events in the Middle East and North Korea have shown time and
again, there is only so much the international community can do when two national
juggernauts collide. “What can New Zealand do to help head off the threat of war?,”
Harland asks, and then reiterates the fundamental issues at play in this case. “Not much,
I am afraid. Striking moral attitudes, and lecturing the powerful on how to use their
power, are not likely to achieve much, and could easily do harm. The best thing we can
do is to keep cool, watch developments carefully, and remember the underlying forces -economic on the one hand, political on the other” (Harland, 2001, p. 28). Just as the U.S.
is seeking China’s assistance in moderating a solution to the North Korean nuclear
dilemma, some observers in the international community believe the best path to future
peace is restraint and counsel: “The best way for us to help avoid conflict between the
United States and China is to go on talking, quietly but clearly, to both sides, and
supporting the forces for moderation and restraint whenever we see an opportunity to do
so” (Harland, 2001, p. 28). This New Zealander’s position was reiterated by Rod Lyon
(2001), who reported that, “The crash landing of the US spy plane on Hainan island
advertised how difficult Australia's position could become in instances of heightened
tension between China and the United States” (p. 516).
According to Lyon, the spy plane incident took place in the context of a new
administration that had already made clear that it intended to distance itself from the
previous administration's policy of treating China as a strategic partner. “Australian
foreign policy was left with no comfortable saddle point. Canberra's instinctive attraction
to Washington's position was moderated by concerns about the level of anti- China
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rhetoric in Washington and a compelling wish to avoid the emergence in Asia of a new
bipolar contest between Australia's traditional ally and the fastest-rising Asian great
power” (Lyon, 2001, p. 516). Like his New Zealand counterpart, Australian Prime
Minister Howard also urged "calm and restraint on all sides" (Lyon, 2001, p. 517).
Further, Labor leader Kevin Rudd noted the dangers of rising tensions between
the United States and China, and Stuart Hams, an academician at the Australian National
University, maintained that Australian policy should be aimed at helping the US and
China to find "a cool and moderate approach" (Lyon, 2001, p. 517). However, it became
increasingly difficult to “keep cool and moderate” in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and whatever political animosities that may have emerged from this
incident seemed to have evaporated in the meantime. While there has not been a U.S.China-Russia alliance as such created to date, the changes in the global political climate
may well result in such an end result in the not-too-distant future: “The gauntlet thrown
down by Al-Qaida of an everlasting war between the West and the ‘believers’ may not
occur. However, if it does, Osama bin Laden's troops may discover that across the divide
there stands not only the United States but also Russia, India, and China” (Picco, 2003, p.
16).
The aforementioned gatekeeping function was clearly in full play during the spy
plane coverage in China by the press on both sides of the issue; however, the degree and
frequency of such influence was much more pronounced on the Chinese side as evinced
by a review of the news coverage, as well as the international response. In his essay,
“The media and politics: It’s more than the news,” Steve Bell reports that what is
becoming increasingly clear is that "the media" needs to be defined in terms that go far
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beyond the news media. “Less than 20 years ago, members of the establishment news
media were the dominant ‘gatekeepers’ when it came to information flow. What they
defined as ‘news’ was pretty much what was available to the public” (Bell, 2001, p. 10).
According to Richard Worf (2002, “During the spy-plane incident, the state-controlled
media presented the loss of the Chinese pilot as an assault on China's dignity. The
government took other steps to stoke Chinese nationalism, such as setting up anti-US
Internet chat rooms. US President George Bush's initial statement of regret never
reached the Chinese people” (p. 7). What actually did reach the Chinese people in the
People’s Daily is examined in section one of Chapter Three below.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD
A comparative case study will be conducted to demonstrate the applicability and
integrity of the three-dimension framing categorization. This research employs the
historical/case study approach and secondary research to answer the above-stated
research questions. The historical method involves a procedure supplementary to
observation, a process by which the historian seeks to test the truthfulness of the reports
of observations that are provided by others (Benz & Newman, 1998).
The case study/historical method serves to closely align the historian with
quantitative researchers and with the traditional scientific method; in this regard, Good
(1963) compared the two research methodologies and then described the uniqueness of
the historian in the case study approach: “Both historian and scientist examine data,
formulate hypotheses, and test the hypotheses against the evidence until acceptable
conclusions are reached” (p. 1983). According to Benz and Newman, a number of
researchers who have employed the historical method have enjoyed success by
emphasizing the interpretation and meaning of facts, and seeking to identify tendencies,
themes, patterns, and laws of history; other historical method investigators have focused
on philosophical or theoretical problems in history, such as the discovery of laws, unity
and continuity, possibility or impossibility of prediction, and oversimplification
stemming from the search for clues or keys (Benz & Newman, 1998). In this regard,
while the facts of the collision were fairly straightforward, three key points of serious
disagreement between China and the U.S. emerged during the controversy that followed
the collision:
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•

First, both sides made conflicting claims as to which aircraft was responsible for
veering from its regular flight path, thereby causing the collision. The Chinese
maintained that the U.S. EP-3 turned at a wide angle, ramming the Chinese F-8.
U.S. authorities, on the other hand, alleged that the F-8 flew under the U.S. plane
and ascended prematurely so it clipped the EP-3 (Chen & Culbertson, 2001).

•

Second, there was the question as to whether the crash occurred in sovereign
Chinese air space or over international waters. The answer to this question
depended on several complex legal questions, with the American authorities
asserting that a nation can claim only about a 12-mile space extending from its
land mass as sovereign territory. According to this interpretation, the crash site
about 65 miles from the Hainan coast would have been over international waters;
however, the Chinese claim a much larger territory, particularly with regard to the
area of the South China Sea (Chen & Culbertson, 2001).

•

Third, the United States claimed that its surveillance planes had been repeatedly
harassed over several months. According to this version of the events, Chinese
fighter pilots had flown dangerously close to U.S. aircraft on several occasions;
however, the Chinese denied this claim (Chen & Culbertson, 2001).
According to Michael B. Salwen and Don W. Stacks (1996), much criticism of

international communication research in the United States since 1970 has been based on
the assertion that such studies support the existing order while claiming to be independent
and value-free; however, the power of Western science in general is a product of the
weight of evidence and logic that accompany claims of knowledge derived from it.
These authors write, “The middle-range theories that communication can muster still rise
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or fall on the traditional criterion of empirical verification” (Salwen & Stacks, 1996, p.
185). The particular problem of international communication involves the fact that there
virtually no research has considered the variables that are assumed to account for the
phenomenon in question. “Part of the problem is a failure to develop appropriate
hypotheses; part is a casual and sometimes deliberate disregard for the protections of
reliability, validity, and adequacy of evidence” (Salwen & Stacks, 1996, p. 185).
Consider the hypothetical but typical international communication study
submitted to a conference or journal with the underlying premise that media around the
world support the status quo. A content analysis could be used to demonstrate that:
(a)

Coverage in The New York Times was more critical of the Tiananmen

Square massacre than coverage in the People's Daily (because both papers reflect their
governments' positions); or,
(b)

Coverage of Tiananmen Square was more negative than coverage of the

abortive coup against President Gorbachev (because the United States opposed the
Chinese government but supported Gorbachev); or,
(c)

Coverage of the coup against Gorbachev was greater than coverage of the

coup against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti (because Gorbachev is White and European
and Aristide is Black and from a developing country) (Salwen & Stacks, 1996).
What is wrong with this approach involves a number of specifics and some
general problems that are unique to international communications. In the first place, if
the hypothesis is that media systems universally maintain political hegemony, then the
key variable is a constant, and no analysis is possible since there will be no discernible
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variance; likewise, if the hypothesis assumes that there is no difference between the two
newspapers, then the null hypothesis is predicted, which cannot be done logically.
According to Salwen and Stacks, this is an assumption in the first example;
however, if the study's goal is to understand something about different media systems and
the varied economic and political systems in which they function, then the basis of
explanation of the difference is difficult at best and will frequently result in dubious
results. In this case, the second example assumes that both events are equivalent, and that
the discernible differences in coverage are derived only from journalistic practice and
political policies (Salwen & Stacks, 1996).
Finally, the third example assumes that news coverage is determined by factors
over which journalists have no control such as capitalism, imperialism, or racism. “In
each case, the assumption is less than persuasive at best, foolish at worst. In this
hypothetical study and in most real studies, the explanatory variable is not explicit, not
subjected to any real test, and not restrained by considerations of reliability, validity, or
adequacy of evidence” (Salwen & Stacks, 1996, p. 186).
Notwithstanding the foregoing constraints associated with studies in international
communication, a case study methodology analysis was employed to determine how this
factual information was presented to the American and Chinese people. To this end,
twenty-five news stories regarding the China-US spy plane standoff appearing during the
period April 2, 2001 (the first date of reporting in both newspapers), to April 30th, 2001
in the New York Times and the People’s Daily were content analyzed and coded.
A code was assigned according to the text’s content as reflecting a predominately
contextual or operational framing aspect (CF and OF, respectively); in addition, an
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indicator was made as to whether there was an accompanying photograph or graphic with
the article (a visual framing element, or “VF”). The statistical analysis was accomplished
using an Excel spreadsheet. The results of the analysis will be presented graphically,
followed by a narrative interpretation in the findings. A summary of the research will be
provided in the conclusion.

Data Analysis and Findings
As noted above, the factual data involved in the spy plane incident are fairly
straightforward. On the morning of April 1, 2001, the collision took place about 65 miles
from the coast of Hainan Island, which is part of the People's Republic of China.
Following the collision, the Chinese F-8 aircraft was unable to fly and crashed into the
South China Sea. The plane's pilot, Wang Wei, parachuted into the sea but a massive
rescue effort over several days failed to find him, and he was presumed dead. Although
the U.S. EP-3 also suffered severe damage, the U.S. aircraft was still able to fly and
landed about 20 minutes after the crash at Hainan's Lishui Airport without receiving
official clearance to land from the Chinese. Thereafter, the EP-3 pilot and crew were
detained on Hainan Island for 11 days. The U.S. crew members were reported to be
treated quite well, with several visits by U.S. authorities being allowed. The U.S. pilot, in
particular, though, was intensively interrogated concerning the circumstances that led to
and followed the crash. The U.S. crew was allowed to leave China on April 12, 2001.
This incident occurred following several months of sustained reconnaissance flights in
the area by U.S. aircraft, “usually at the rate of about 4-5 flights per week” (Ricks, 2001,
p. A01).
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Section One: People’s Daily: April 2-April 27, 2001
While there were more than 25 articles published in the People’s Daily during the
month of April 2001 concerning the events surrounding the spy plane incident of April 1,
the following representative selections were used to provide a side-by-side comparison
with comparable articles found in the New York Times. It should be pointed out that on
the then-missing Chinese pilot’s birthday, April 8, 2001, there was a substantial increase
in the number of articles dedicated to this story, with the majority of them focusing on the
heroic sacrifices made by the pilot in his defense of the motherland.
Further, both publications included additional graphics and pictures that were not
accompanied by an article but a caption only, such as the arrival of the U.S. crew back
home in America in the New York Times. In all cases, the graphics and pictures were not
available for review and the content was extrapolated based on the editorial descriptions
provided, and these visual frames were included in the data analysis as appropriate.
Content categorizations of each article from the respective publications are provided in
Tables 1 and 2 below, with graphic representations of the data following.
Table 1 People’s Daily Content Analysis.
Date

Article Title

Src

Code

VF #

PD

CF

1

Chinese Fighter Bumped by US Military
April 02

Surveillance Plane
Chinese Official Rebuffs US over Air

April 03

Collision Demand.

PD

CF

0

April 04

US Should Bear Full Responsibility for Plane

PD

CF

0
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Collision
FM Spokesman Gives Full Account of Air
April 04

Collision

PD

CF

2

April 05

Chinese People Concerned Over Missing Pilot

PD

CF

0

PD

CF

1

US Fully Responsible for Air Collision:
April 05

Witness
US Diplomats to Meet Spy Plane Crew for the

April 06

Third Time

PD

OF

0

April 06

Missing Chinese Pilot's Wife Writes to Bush

PD

CF

1

My Husband Is still Alive: Missing Pilot's
April 06

Wife

PD

CF

0

April 07

Gloomy Birthday for Missing Pilot

PD

CF

0

PD

CF

0

PD

CF

1

U.S. Must Bear All Responsibility for
April 07

Collision: Law Expert
Chinese President Expresses Solicitude to

April 08

Wife of Missing Pilot
China, U.S. Discuss Settlement of Plane

April 09

Collision

PD

OF

1

April 09

US Spy Plane's Aggressive Tricks Told

PD

CF

0

Spokesman Comments on US Wording
April 10

"Sorry"

PD

CF

0

April 10

Missing Pilot's Wife Well Cared for

PD

CF

1

April 11

FM Spokesman on Letter From U.S. Saying

PD

CF

0

34

"Very Sorry"
China US to Continue Negotiations on Plane
April 12

Collision Incident

PD

OF

0

PD

CF

0

PD

CF

0

US Urged to Halt Spy Activities along China's
April 13

Coastal Areas
China Refutes Irresponsible Comments of US

April 14

Side on Collision
Missing Pilot Model for Officers Soldiers:

April 15

Navy Chief

PD

CF

0

April 16

Countrymen Mourn for Missing Pilot

PD

CF

0

PD

OF

0

China US to Negotiate on Plane Collision
April 17

Incident
China-U.S. Plane Collision Not China's Fault

April 22

Belarus says

PD

CF

0

April 27

China Mourns Over Death of Heroic Pilot

PD

CF

1

35

25

20

15

10

5

0
Context
Framed

Operational
Frame

Visual Frame

Content
Figure 1 Content Analysis of People’s Daily.
Findings. As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the overwhelming majority (61
percent) of the articles appearing in the People’s Daily were, not unsurprisingly,
contextually framed accounts of the spy plane collision. Furthermore, only contextually
framed articles were accompanied by any visual framing elements, of which there were
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nine total (one map from each publication was excluded from this analysis). In fact, for
over a full week, every story appearing in the People’s Daily was contextually framed,
and it was not until April 9 that a story appeared that contained any objective reporting at
all from the Chinese media.
All told, there were only four operationally framed articles, or 16 percent, and
even here, there were touches of bias concerning the mainstream Chinese position on the
events without a corresponding assessment of the U.S. position.

Section Two: The New York Times: April 2-April 27, 2001
In sharp contrast to the coverage as presented in the People’s Daily, the events
surrounding the spy plane collision as reported in the New York Times assumed an overall
more balanced, yet occasionally U.S.-slanted perspective, in its reporting throughout the
month.
Table 2 New York Times Analysis.
Co
Date

Article Title

Src

de

VF #

NYT

OF

0

NYT

OF

0

U.S. PLANE IN CHINA AFTER IT
April 02

COLLIDES WITH CHINESE JET
MILITARY ANALYSIS; 'A Dangerous

April 03

Game'
Japan and the Koreas Stand By Their

April 04

Respective Allies as All Feel the Tension

NYT

OF

0

April 05

Powell Offers China Aides Outline for

NYT

OF

0
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Standoff's End
U.S. Envoy Meets Chinese Foreign Minister
April 06

as Negotiations on Plane's Crew Continue

NYT

OF

0

NYT

CF

0

NYT

OF

0

China's Demand for Apology Is Rooted in
April 07

Tradition
CHINESE INSISTING U.S. MUST DO

April 08

MORE TO END STANDOFF
U.S. and China Look for a Way To Say

April 09

'Sorry'

NYT

OF

0

April 10

Questioning By Chinese Is Intense

NYT

OF

0

April 11

In a Hint of Progress

NYT

CF

0

NYT

CF

0

Standoff Brings Calls to Boycott Chinese
April 11

Goods
U.S. SENDS BEIJING FORMAL

April 11

STATEMENT EXPRESSING REGRET

NYT

OF

0

April 12

A Readiness to Let Bygones Be Bygones

NYT

CF

0

April 12

Tempers Are Cooling

NYT

OF

0

CHINA RELEASES U.S. PLANE CREW
April 12

11 DAYS AFTER MIDAIR COLLISION

NYT

OF

0

April 13

With crew in U.S., Bush sharpens tone

NYT

CF

0

Beijing Declares Victory but Chat Rooms
April 13

Are Skeptical

NYT

CF

0

April 14

U.S. Tape Is Said to Show Reckless Flying

NYT

CF

0

38

by Chinese
Angry Beijing Denounces Washington's
April 15

Reports That Its Pilot Caused the Collision

NYT

OF

0

April 16

Plane Crew Details Detention in China

NYT

CF

0

NYT

CF

0

Bush to Tackle Delicate Issue of Resuming
April 17

China Spy Flights
Knotty Task of Beijing Talks on Plane:

April 18

Reconciling Reality With Posturing

NYT

OF

0

April 19

After Rancorous Start

NYT

CF

2

U.S.-China Collision Talks End With Need
April 20

for More Talk

NYT

CF

2

April 27

Beijing Journal; A Pilot Is Lost

NYT

CF

2

April 30

China relaxing the tension

NYT

CF

0

39

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
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Figure 2 Content Analysis of The New York Times
As can be seen from Figure 2 above, the Times used contextual framing only 38
percent of the time, with operational framing being the technique of choice at 41 percent
of the time.
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A side-by-side comparison of the content analysis for the People’s Daily and The
New York Times is also revealing:
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Figure 3 Comparison of People’s Daily and New York Times Content.

As noted above, all visually framed articles were contextually framed, but the
People’s Daily incorporated this element more frequently than the New York Times as
shown in Figure 4 below; whether this difference can be attributed to the intentional use
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of graphic elements to sway the reader one way or another or to editorial policy or
publishing constraints within the respective publications is unclear though.

Visual Framing Elements

People's Daily

New York Times

Figure 4 Comparison of Visual Framing Elements used in People’s Daily and New York
Times.

While the New York Times only resorted to reporting the spy plane collision
events in an contextually framed manner less than half of the time (48 percent), the
People’s Daily relied on this approach almost exclusively, using contextually framed
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techniques in 21 (or 84 percent) of their articles, and it should be pointed out that the
remainder were also characterized to some degree by such biases as well.

Confirmation and Rejection of Hypotheses
The hypotheses that guided this research project are as follows
Hypothesis 1 From the perspective of the Bush administration, this diplomatic
standoff with a newly defined “strategic competitor” provided a crucial test to his ability
and experience in handling foreign affairs; these attributes in particular had been under
increasing criticism in the months from April 2001. The results of how Bush handled this
international incident could shape the domestic public opinion and worldview after the
election controversy that had immediately preceded it.
From China perspective, even before this tragic incident, the Chinese people and
its leaders had already been on the receiving end of hostile rhetoric from the newly
elected Bush; this served to remind the Chinese people and their leadership about the
embassy bombing in Yugoslavia just 2 years previously; moreover, such a direct military
conflict between two nuclear powers has not taken place since the end of the Cold War.
From an international political perspective, the mainstream media in both countries
should reasonably have been expected to concentrate their coverage of the event on the
facts in an objective fashion and used relevant graphics when appropriate to communicate
them. From this perspective, the media accounts in The New York Times and The
People’s Daily should have employed a similar judgment regarding the respective
political importance of every part of this event. As a result, the visual framing strategy
utilized by the two newspapers would reflect this tendency.
This hypothesis is rejected in its entirety.
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Hypothesis 2 Contextual framing works through deliberately choosing opinionloaded words or authoritative sources to define responsibility and moral basis. For
example, how to name an event becomes important when selecting the word to describe
it; “accident” implies there was no actual fault while “incident” connotes a controversy.
There will also be careful consideration given to the selection of descriptions of the
action involved; for instance, should the collision be reported as the result of a “spy
mission” or “routine reconnaissance routine”? Likewise, there will be careful
considerations given to the treatment of the actors in the event; descriptions such as spy,
detainee, hero or Top- Gun may be employed. The sources of facts used in the respective
media would also play a role if only one side of the story was presented. The manner in
which each of these components is presented may not seem important in isolation from
the others, but taken together, they help to form important judgmental frames for readers.
One contextual tool that has been widely manipulated in international events by
both sides is language translations and mistranslations. Based on the language barrier
between the Chinese and American people, the audience on each side will only be able to
learn about the other party’s messages through media’s translations, which represent yet
another opportunity for shaping due to contextual framing.
Given the sensitive time, sensitive location and sensitive nature of this collision, both
parties would have adopted all kinds of contextual framing techniques to occupy the
moral high ground, and accuse the other side of wrongdoing. Since the foreign policy
report in China is strictly controlled by the Communist Party, the news event portrayed
by the Chinese media would be more homogenous and one-sided.
This hypothesis is supported by the findings.
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Hypothesis 3 The blocking of the free flow of information, though weakened by
the internet expansion in recent years, has still been carefully and successfully executed
in international news coverage, either under the pressure from the government directly, or
by the influences from certain interest groups. Such an intentional omission creates either
a time lag or an information lag in people’s reasoning. As a result, the audience’s logical
judgment may be distorted to a preferred direction.
Both sides will deliberately ignore or withhold some unfavorable evidence and
change the actual time order of some key elements during their news coverage. Because
the Chinese media are faced with far more direct oversight from their government and the
ruling party to serve the established foreign policy of their U.S. counterparts, it would be
reasonable to expect them to curtail, distort or otherwise shape the facts of an event to
mirror the party line. As to the American side, the increasingly fierce competition in the
information market have reduced the possibility of completely withholding certain facts;
however, it would be naïve to assume that similar processes are not at play in the United
States, again, only to a different degree.
This hypothesis was confirmed except to the extent that the time order of the
events involved was distorted by either side. There was no indication of the times or
dates of the events involved being changed, distorted or otherwise misrepresented by
either side in the media coverage. Both sides were found to downplay the other side’s
argument while highlighting their own position, but the Chinese media resorted to this
tactic much more frequently than their New York Times counterparts. Nevertheless, The
New York Times was also shown to engage in the same types of gatekeeping functions as
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their Chinese counterparts, although as noted, to a lesser extent; further, this is not a new
phenomenon for the Times, though.

Validity and Reliability
According to Braun and Wainer’s book, Test Validity (1988), defined in purely
operational terms, validity is simply the correlation of scores on a test with some other
objective measure of that which the test is used to measure. Others have defined validity
in similar terms: “In a very general sense, a test is valid for anything with which it
correlates”; however, unlike reliability, validity is not a general characteristic of a test,
but is rather specific to a particular purpose (Braun & Wainer, 1988, p. 20). Therefore, a
well-designed research methodology might be highly valid for one application, but not
valid for others. The comparison of two separate accounts of a specific international
incident represents just such a specific application requiring a specific methodology.
Assuming that careful attention is given to the various visual and contextual
framing elements defined above, though, it is believed that one researcher should be able
to derive much the same results from an analysis of the event coverage in the various
media as presented below; however, it is unreasonable to assume that personal bias would
affect such subjective interpretations of international events based on an individual’s
nationality and general worldview. In other words, a Chinese researcher, however well
intentioned and subjective-minded, would likely view these news accounts from a
drastically different perspective than an American counterpart and vice versa. Therefore,
future investigations of this nature should incorporate comparable analyses of identical
news events from various media to determine the extent to such inherent ethnocentrism
on the part of the review, if in fact it exists.
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Conclusion
The research showed that on April 1, 2001, an otherwise routine surveillance
flight by an American EP3E Aries II surveillance plane through international air space
turned into an international media event. A collision between a Chinese fighter jet and
the American plane resulted in serious damage and an emergency landing for the
American crew of 24, and resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot. In response, and
predictably enough, the Americans and Chinese quickly lined up behind their respective
carved-in-stone positions and fired salvo after salvo of increasingly heated rhetoric at
each other through their respective news media. To their credit, the Chinese media, at
least as reflected in the People’s Daily, did manage to communicate the basic facts of the
event to its readers; however, and not surprisingly, the mainstream Chinese media
continues to operate under the oversight of a Communist government that is vitally
concerned with its international image and which is not currently constrained in doing so
in any substantive way. In fact, if there had not been a loss of life involved, the collision
between the U.S. Air Force and Chinese Air Force jets might have just been glossed over
and everyone would have shaken hands and retired to their respective WTO-sponsored
corners. Since a Chinese pilot was killed, though, and the Americans were engaged in
admitted spying activities after all, it quickly became clear in the People’s Daily that a
simple apology would not be sufficient, and this was simply non-negotiable. Likewise,
had there not been a loss of life involved, the coverage in the Chinese press would have
been positively humorous; in fact, by the time the Chinese press got through with him,
the killed Chinese pilot did not even need a fighter jet to fly, but had bestowed upon him
the stature of a heroic “Communist Titan” who was “even good at housework” and a
“skillful tailor who made a fashionable skirt for his wife to mark their wedding
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anniversary” (Eckholm, 2001, A2). The research showed that although the New York
Times employed contextually framed accounts to report the spy plane collision events
less than half of the time (48 percent), the People’s Daily used this technique to the
almost total exclusion of others, employing contextually framed techniques fully 84
percent of their reports, with the rest being flavored to some extent in this manner. In the
final analysis, although it is unlikely that most Chinese citizens would engage in such a
side-by-side comparison of international news accounts as the foregoing, the fact that the
international media is becoming more widespread in this country, as well as the fact that
the Chinese people now represent the second-largest users of the Internet after the United
States, means that the ability of state-run media outlets such as the People’s Daily to use
such techniques is slowly coming to an end, and it reasonable to assume that by the end
of the 21st century, the Chinese people would read comparable versions of a similar event
in either the People’s Daily or the New York Times.
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